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Practitioner Points 
 
• The multiplicity of actors, contexts and objectives in complex public 
administration projects present distinct challenges to leaders, requiring a 
nuanced set of leadership practices. 
 
• Evidence from this study suggests that in low complexity environments 
administrative leadership practices such as directing, planning and resourcing 
are common. In medium complexity environments, administrative leadership 
was still present while adaptive practices, such as the inclusion of diverse 
skills and perspectives appear to be important. 
 
• Adaptive practices were observed to the greatest extent in the most complex 
cases, outnumbering administrative practices over 2 to 1. The need to actively 
support the inclusion of diverse skills / perspectives (including boundary 
spanning) was dominant, but other adaptive practices such as stimulating 
innovative ideas and changing plans, processes and routines also featured to a 
greater extent than in the medium complexity cases.  
 
• The significant contribution of this paper is evidence of the role of enabling 
leadership in managing the tensions created by the need to achieve both a 
sense of stability in order to coordinate, structure and control organizational 
activity (administrative) and the conditions for innovation, change and 
transformation (adaption).  The paper shows that administrative and adaptive 
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practices need not be mutually exclusive or conflicting but can enable each 
other. 
 
• Greater attention needs to be paid to the tensions inherent in enabling 
leadership if actors are to cope with the complex, collaborative cross boundary 
work in which they are increasingly engaged.  
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Managing the Entanglement: Complexity Leadership in Public 
Sector Systems 
 
Abstract 
Complexity in public sector systems requires leaders to balance the administrative 
practices necessary to be aligned and efficient in the management of routine 
challenges, and the adaptive practices required to respond to dynamic circumstances.  
Conventional notions of leadership in the field of public administration do not fully 
explain the role of leadership in balancing the entanglement of formal, top-down, 
administrative functions and informal, emergent, adaptive functions within public 
sector settings with different levels of complexity.  Drawing on and extending 
existing complexity leadership constructs, this paper explores how leadership is 
enacted over the duration of six urban regeneration projects, representing high, 
medium and low levels of project complexity.  The study suggests that greater 
attention needs to be paid to the tensions inherent in enabling leadership if actors are 
to cope with the complex, collaborative, cross-boundary, adaptive work in which they 
are increasingly engaged.   
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Managing the Entanglement: Complexity Leadership in Public Sector 
Systems 
 
Public administration and leadership scholars express growing concerns that existing 
models of leadership may not fully capture the leadership dynamics operating in 
today’s complex environments (McKelvey and Lichtenstein, 2007).  In a recent issue 
of Public Administration Review, authors (Van Wart, 2013; Hansen, 2013; 
Nalbandian, O’Neil, Wilkes and Kaufman, 2013) emphasized the importance of 
leadership processes in enabling change and transformation in complex public sector 
systems, yet many of these studies drew on leadership constructs based on “classical 
management and role theory” (Van Wart, 2013: 553).  In the 21st century, the 
multiplicity of actors, contexts and paradigmatic shifts in public administration 
present distinct challenges to leadership (Terry, 1995; Van Wart, 2003; Heifetz, 
Linsky and Grashow, 2009).  Leadership is “embedded in a complex interplay of 
numerous interacting forces” (Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey, 2007: 302).  
Unstable times and crises increase distractions and often require unique approaches 
(Boin and Otten, 1996; Wheatley, 2006; Van Wart 2003).  It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that researchers have struggled to come to terms with the empirical 
realities and the subtlety of exploring leadership practices in such “tangled” 
environments (Van Wart, 2003). 
Recent research on complexity leadership has challenged traditional notions of 
leadership by shifting attention away from the characteristics of leaders and the 
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actions of individuals towards the relational, dynamic, distributed nature of leadership 
processes (Uhl-Bien, 2006; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).  The complexity perspective 
suggests that leadership is required to maintain a sense of stability in order to 
coordinate, structure and control organizational activity as well as generate the 
conditions for innovation, change and transformation (Uhl-Bien, et al., 2007).  This 
requires enabling leadership (Uhl-Bien, et al., 2007) to ensure an appropriate balance 
of these administrative (formal) and adaptive (informal) functions (Selznick, 1949).   
While complexity leadership offers a new understanding of leadership processes, the 
literature is largely conceptual, and has not yet adequately addressed leadership at 
various levels of systems complexity (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009) or studied 
ongoing public-sector contexts.  This article aims to address these gaps.  The cases 
presented offer a particularly rich data set to identify leadership processes across 
broadly similar public sector projects, but carried out in contexts with different levels 
of complexity.  By examining six case studies in urban regeneration in Belfast 
(Northern Ireland, UK) and Dublin (Republic of Ireland), this article focuses on 
exploring leadership practices empirically in an effort to understand how leadership is 
enacted in public sector systems. 
We begin by discussing and challenging the existing literature on leadership in public 
administration.  We then draw on the literature on complexity leadership to build a 
theoretical framework and provide our research questions. To address our first 
research question we classify the six urban regeneration projects in terms of 
complexity defined by the diversity of the urban regeneration project and its duration.  
Following a description of our research methods, we report our findings showing the 
instances of adaptive, administrative and enabling leadership by level of project 
complexity.  To address our second research question, the main body of the article is 
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concerned with a qualitative examination of the tensions inherent in enabling 
leadership in the six cases.  We conclude with implications for leadership theory, 
practice and development.    
Rethinking public sector leadership - a review of the literature 
Although there has been a number of important studies on leadership in the field of 
public administration (see e.g. Fernandez, 2005; Kim, 2002; Terry, 2002; Wright and 
Pandey, 2010), compared to the mainstream organizational literature, leadership 
theory has generally received less attention (Hansen and Villadsen, 2010). As a result, 
there are few large-scale empirical studies of public sector leadership (Trottier, Van 
Wart and Wang, 2008) and increasing calls to further embed public leadership 
research within leadership studies (Ospina and Wagner, in press).  Studies of public 
sector leadership tend to draw on a range of perspectives including classical 
management and role theory, transactional leadership theory, transformational 
leadership theory, horizontal or collaborative leadership theory and ethical and critical 
leadership theory (Van Wart, 2013).  Yet, despite this apparent pluralism, the public 
administration literature has lagged behind the mainstream organizational literature in 
challenging some of the basic assumptions of traditional leadership theory.  New 
conceptualizations of leadership, drawing on complexity science, are emerging in the 
mainstream organizational literatures that have much to offer public administration. 
Traditional leadership theory, in both public administration and organizational 
literatures, has largely been concerned with a focus on leaders and the actions of 
individuals rather than the dynamic, complex systems, processes and practices that 
comprise leadership (Uhl-Bien, 2006).  The leader centric view is fundamentally a 
legacy of the great-man thesis that characterized early leadership research (Terry, 
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1995; Van Wart, 2003).  This perspective has been widely criticized for romanticizing 
leaders as heroic figures (Gronn, 2002).  Critics regard this body of theory as 
normative in its perspective, nearly always focusing on ideal practices of “great” 
leaders (Van Wart, 2003).  Despite this critique, the notion of leadership as “being in” 
a specific administrative leader or CEO remains the dominant paradigm.  For 
example, authors have focused on qualities that enable one to enter the fundamental 
state of leadership (Quinn, 2005), which is “an underlying characteristic of an 
individual” (Boyatzis, 1982: 21).  The result has been an overabundance of studies 
that focus on the values, qualities and behavioral styles that make for “good” 
leadership.  Some research in public administration has argued that leaders in the 
public sector are severely constrained from making significant differences (Kaufman, 
1981).  This conclusion is unsurprising if performance is to be explained by analyzing 
individual leaders and specific leader practices and linking these directly to public 
sector outcomes.  This is not to say that formal leaders do not or should not play a role 
in bringing about change (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009). They have an influence 
“in and around the system” (Osborn, Hunt and Jauch, 2002: 798) where social 
interactions and reciprocal influence patterns enable leading–following relationships 
to develop and evolve over time (DeRue, Nahrgang, Wellman and Humphrey, 2011) 
and on the relational ways in which stories and narratives are used in leadership 
practice (Orr and Bennett, in press).  
An alternative to a person-centric perspective is to regard leadership as a “social 
influence process through which emergent coordination (e.g. evolving social order) 
and change (e.g. new approaches, values, attitudes, practices, ideologies) are 
constructed and produced” (Uhl-Bien, 2006: 668).  The acts of leading can take on 
multiple directions, transcend formal hierarchies and involve multiple actors.  From 
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this perspective, actors, regardless of hierarchical position can enact practices that are 
traditionally viewed as leader practices or acts of followership.  Traditional theories of 
leadership struggle to sufficiently explain this form of ‘‘leading up’’ or ‘‘leading 
across’’ (DeRue et al., 2011).  Leadership, from a complexity perspective, is argued to 
occur in the “space between” individuals (Lichtenstein, Uhl-Bien, Marion, Seers and 
Orton, 2007: 5), a “meso” level mechanism (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009) that 
reflects the network of interactions between formal levels.  From this perspective 
leadership is regarded as a social, dynamic, and processual phenomenon (Uhl-Bien, 
2006; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).   Relational leadership underpins many of the new 
approaches emerging in the leadership literature, e.g., collaborative (Raelin, 2006), 
distributed (Gronn, 2002), shared (Pearce and Conger, 2003), and complexity (Marion 
and Uhl-Bien, 2001).  Relational leadership is a “social influence process through 
which emergent coordination (i.e., evolving social order) and change (i.e., new values, 
attitudes, approaches, practices, ideologies, etc.) are constructed and produced” (Uhl-
Bien, 2006, 668).  Developing a deeper understanding of leadership processes, not the 
attributes of leaders, in complex environments is required to explain the processes by 
which social order is constructed and changed (Hosking and Morley, 1988) and is 
critical to this study, which seeks to deepen our understanding of how leadership is 
accomplished in public sector systems. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Complexity leadership theory suggests that formal top-down administrative forces 
and informal, adaptive emergent practices are entangled within and across people and 
practices (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).  Administrative leadership (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 
2007) emphasizes formalized structures for authority and decision-making, a focus on 
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stability and control, internal integration through standardized processes planning and 
coordination of operations, resource allocation and structuring of tasks (Marion and 
Uhl-Bien, 2007). The leadership function involves directing, planning and resourcing 
activities (Uhl Bien et al, 2007), helping followers understand role and task 
requirements (Bass, 1985), clarifying roles and responsibilities (Osborn and Hunt, 
2007), providing answers (Grint 2005) and resolving problems by applying existing 
know how (Heifetz, 1994) and integrating and embedding innovations into the formal 
system (Marion and Uhl Bien, 2007).  
Adaptive leadership is an informal leadership process that involves generating and 
advancing novel solutions in the face of adaptive needs of the organization (Heifetz 
and Laurie, 2001).  This leadership function involves fostering experiments, new 
discoveries and adjustments from numerous places in the organization or community 
(Marion and Uhl Bien, 2007), injecting ideas and information so that plans, processes 
and routines are adapted to changing conditions and setbacks (Dougherty and Hardy, 
1996).  Creative problem solving requires multiple viewpoints, voices and the 
encouragement of divergent skills and perspectives (Heifetz and Laurie, 2001). 
Leadership can create the context for innovative ideas and new ways of working to 
flourish. Innovative responses to complex problems can trigger further change and 
“higher-order responses” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007: 303).  Adaptation can be emergent, 
unpredictable and unexplainable (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001) and can be generated 
through struggles among agents and groups or by the clash of existing but (seemingly) 
incompatible needs, ideas, or preferences (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). 
Enabling leadership serves to cope with the coordination rhythms, or oscillations, 
between top-down, hierarchical dynamics and emergent complex adaptive systems 
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(Uhl-Bien and Marion 2009).  An overemphasis on administrative leadership in 
complex and volatile environments could deprive an organization of much needed 
adaptive capacity (Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey, 2007). Our reading of the 
literature reveals four core tensions addressed by the means of enabling leadership.  
First, adaptation and change can lead to chaotic collective action and “sustained 
periods of stress” (Heifetz, 1994: 35).  Yet, in other situations enabling leadership 
may also include injecting adaptive tension to help motivate and coordinate the 
interactive dynamic (Uhl Bien, 209).   Second, leadership in certain environments is 
required to help actors make sense out of what is happening and give meaning to 
unfolding events (Plowman and Silansky et al., 2007).  From this perspective, actors 
do not create change, rather they catalyze its development by giving meaning to 
actions that might otherwise go unnoticed” (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 398).  
However, in other contexts leaders are involved in sense-breaking (Weick, 1996) to 
unfreeze entrenched assumptions (Plowman and Silansky et al., 2007) and disrup 
existing patterns by surfacing conflict, creating controversy and fostering discomfort 
(Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009).  Third, enabling leadership can be required to 
connect “otherwise disjointed groups” (Schreiber and Carley, 2006 p. 136) and 
formalise networks to give them legitimacy. However, in other situations adaptation 
requires mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 1993), heedful interrelating (Roberts and 
Weick, 1993) and other processes of informal communication between people 
conducting interdependent work.   Fourth, enabling leadership sometimes involves 
actively removing, excluding or alienating certain actors and yet in other situations 
leadership is required to protect dissident voices (Heifetz and Laurie, 2001) and 
facilitate collective action by protecting actors from external politics and top down 
directives (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001). We argue that these four aspects of enabling 
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leadership are held in tension and can shift collective action towards either adaptive or 
administrative functions.  For example, reducing conflict and tension is considered a 
practice that shifts the balance towards administrative leadership, while injecting 
tension and conflict shifts the balance the other way - toward adaption and change. 
These are represented by the arrows in our theoretical framework summarized in 
Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Our theoretical model raises two critical questions.  First, what is the relationship 
between environmental complexity and the balance of administrative, adaptive and 
enabling leadership?  Second, how does enabling leadership help manage the 
entanglement (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007) of formal top-down, administrative forces and 
informal, adaptive emergent forces? To investigate these questions this study provides 
an in-depth analysis of six urban regeneration initiatives.  
Research approach - examining complex case data for leadership practices 
Regeneration projects are chosen because they involve multiple actors and decisions, 
vary in terms of diversity and duration, and thereby allow an examination of the 
unfolding of leadership practices under different levels of complexity (Barzelay and 
Füchtner, 2003).  Roden Street involves the regeneration of a small street in south 
Belfast.  This project was a small ‘pilot’ nested within a much larger regeneration 
project, in the Greater Village Area of Belfast: a well-known Loyalist area with a long 
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history of paramilitary activity throughout the Northern Ireland troubles (Shirlow, 
2003).    
Ballymun was developed in the mid-1960s. It was Ireland’s first, and last, high-rise 
social housing project.  Built on the outskirts of the city and near the airport, it was a 
symbol of progress in Irish urban planning and development and was designed to 
address the serious shortage of urban housing at that time.  
The Clonard area of West Belfast was targeted for redevelopment by the Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) after the publication of the first Making Belfast 
Work (MBW) strategy in 1988 as it had long been an area of significant economic and 
social deprivation as well as civil unrest.  The targeted area consisted of 650 ‘kitchen’ 
or ‘parlor’ houses – terraced houses with two rooms on each of two floors.  The area 
was and continues to be largely Catholic and Nationalist, with a tight-knit community 
and strong voluntary and community organizations.   
The Fatima Mansions project is located in the southwest section of Dublin City, 
relatively near to the city center, consisting mainly of local authority constructed and 
managed flats.  While the location is prime in terms of access to city-based amenities, 
jobs and transport systems, the area has a reputation for crime, drug-dealing and other 
anti-social behavior that is one of the worst in the country.  Originally consisting of 
363 flats and 11 acres, Fatima Mansions represents a medium-sized project in Dublin 
and, at the end of 2004, the project to regenerate the area was just getting underway, 
with about 1/3rd of the original fourteen apartment blocks demolished, residents 
moved out and the redevelopment plan approved and project managers in place.   
The Hardwicke Street project encompassed the regeneration of 11 blocks and 210 
flats in Dublin's Northside and was managed directly by the local authority.  There 
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were a minimal number and range of stakeholders involved, namely the local 
authority, the residents and the construction company who won the tender. The total 
time required from the start of the project (1999) to its conclusion (2005) was 
relatively short.   
The Connswater project is located within the ‘Island’ local Government electoral 
ward of East Belfast, close to the Harland and Woolf shipyard and the new ‘Titanic 
quarter’. This had a population of about 1800 people. The project began to gather 
momentum in 1998 with rumors of redevelopment with a vesting order issued in 
January 2000. In socio-economic terms, Inner East Belfast (including the Island ward) 
has consistently been identified as having some of the worst levels of poverty and 
deprivation in Northern Ireland. The 2005 Noble Report on deprivation and 
disadvantage placed the constituency as the fifth worst performing of the eighteen 
parliamentary constituencies in Northern Ireland. 
We classify the six urban regeneration projects in terms of levels of complexity (high, 
medium and low, See Table 1).  More detailed descriptions of the regeneration 
projects can be found in the online supplement that accompanies this article (Endnote 
1).  In classifying the cases we considered both diversity, in terms of range of 
features, and duration of the projects. Page (2011) argues that diversity is a 
fundamental feature of complexity and defines three different categories: within type, 
across types and community composition (Endnote 2).  The cases in this study were 
selected with a view to capturing situations in which decision-makers were faced with 
varying levels of diversity, e.g., different stages in the project lifecycle (beginning, 
middle, end), different types of agents having significant input into decisions (public 
sector led vs. a broad mix of participants), and the size of the projects (in terms of 
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numbers of dwellings involved). In Table 1, we illustrate the outworking of these 
elements under the column heading 'Diversity'.  
Time and its impact on public management has long been recognized as an important 
but often underappreciated feature of the field (Gulick, 1987; Pollitt, 2008).  Haynes 
(2003) claims "chaos and complexity and their definitions are linked profoundly to 
time” (p. 32), and goes on to say that in an environment of rapidly changing 
technological, social and/or policy elements, the longer the duration of a public 
management project, the greater the complexity and risk of failure.  The time 
dimension of each project is described under the column heading 'Duration' in Table 
1. 
[Table 1  here] 
Data collection and analysis  
Data were collected on the processes, factors and outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
Barzelay and Füchtner, 2003) of decision-making in the six cases based on 32 semi-
structured interviews with the key actors involved in the urban regeneration projects 
along with an analysis of secondary sources.  Urban regeneration projects are 
potentially controversial with sensitive outcomes making access to informants and 
other information problematic. The researchers therefore needed to engage with a 
small number of key practitioners to broker access into seemingly inaccessible 
research settings (Van de Ven 2007, p. 50).  A snowballing or ‘chain referral 
‘sampling technique was then employed by the researchers to identify potential 
informants.  The method is “well suited for a number of research purposes and is 
particularly applicable when the focus of study is on a sensitive issue, possibly 
concerning a relatively private matter, and thus requires the knowledge of insiders to 
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locate people for study.”  (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981: 141). After interviewing the 
initial informants, the researcher asked for assistance from the interviewees to help 
identify other key people involved in the urban regeneration projects.  This type of 
sampling technique works like chain referral and is appropriate when cases are rare or 
data collection limited to a very small subgroup of the population.   Chain referral 
continued until new interviewees added little to the understanding of leadership in 
urban regeneration.  
All interviews lasted around 90 minutes.  Many informants were interviewed more 
than once.  All researchers used a consistent interview guide comprised of five 
sections: 1) review of factual information about the project; 2) description of their 
organization, 3) key issues and strategic decisions, 4) objectives and key events and 5) 
future changes / challenges.  At the end of the interview, informants were invited to 
share any additional information they felt was relevant.  Interviews were sent back to 
interviewees for their review and commentary.  Over half of all interviewees provided 
feedback, including corrections and further explanations.  
In developing the case write-up, the interview data was supplemented with document 
analysis. Source material included community consultation documents, political 
engagement in planning processes, funding applications in relation to social capacity 
building, reports in national and local media, and website data from the various 
community, statutory and private sector organizations involved. These were large, 
public, consultative and sometimes controversial urban development processes and 
such generated a great deal of information, both in print, online and through minutes / 
records of meetings and discussions within and between resident’s groups and 
statutory agencies.  
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Analysis of the interviews and secondary data involved a number of steps.  The 
original cases were written up by three different researchers and key project decisions 
were identified within each case.  Cases and the data used were then reviewed by the 
research team to improve consistency between researchers in relation to the 
identification of decision-points. Following the review of the complexity leadership 
literature, an initial list of leadership practices was drawn up and the cases and the 
interviews were then reanalyzed to extract the range of administrative, adaptive and 
enabling leadership practices that could be observed at key decision points.   
We reviewed each case write-up and interview transcript section-by-section and 
identified segments of text to populate a leadership practices data-extraction table.  
The leadership practices were amended as the analysis developed and we were open 
to the possibility of adding new processes not identified in the original literature 
review. This enabled us to identify leadership practices in each of the key decision 
points in the six cases of urban regeneration.  Three researchers were individually 
responsible for coding the data and an independent researcher, not involved in the 
original data collection, reviewed and discussed the analysis with the original coders 
until consensus was reached on how to classify instances of leadership within each of 
the categories (adaptive, administrative and enabling). The final step involved 
comparing, contrasting and synthesizing the codes in the data extraction table, whilst 
also returning to the original case write ups, interviews and to the secondary data 
(document analysis) to ensure that interpretation of events and processes were 
accurate and that our analysis still reflected the contextual sensitivities of each case. 
Reviewing and discussing the coding choices while returning to the literature on 
complexity leadership also strengthened the coding process.  Some codes of similar 
meaning were merged and renamed to reflect the key leadership practices identified in 
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the six cases of urban regeneration. When completed, the data extraction table was far 
too large to be included in the article.  An example of the coding approach is provided 
in Appendix 1.  A quantitative summary of the findings is included in Figure 2. 
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Findings 
In the low complexity cases (Connswater and Hardwick Street) administrative 
leadership practices, such as directing, planning and resourcing activities, creating 
clear lines of authority and integrating innovation into the formal system, were 
particularly prevalent. The majority of observed practices in these two cases were in 
the administrative category, but that did not mean that there were no adaptive 
practices observed.  However, adaptive practices appeared in few of the key decision 
points and were 'wrapped around' with enabling practices - possibly to ensure that 
uncertainty or diverse views did not derail progress. In low complexity environments, 
the adaptive practices were few and far between and appeared during decision points 
that introduced new actors into the system whose input was considered and then 
integrated into the otherwise linear planning and implementation processes. 
In the medium complexity cases (Clonard and Fatima Mansions), administrative 
leadership practices are still present - perhaps to ensure that activities remain 
consistent with strategy and mission.  Actively supporting the inclusion of diverse 
skills / perspectives (including boundary-spanning), appear to be particularly 
important in these cases, as well as in the high complexity cases. In the Clonard case, 
changing plans, processes, routines in response to tensions, also appeared a number of 
times. In fact, this particular practice appeared most often in the Clonard case, which 
was characterized by several major changes during the implementation phase.  
Adaptive practices were observed to the greatest extent in the most complex cases and 
remained constant and indeed dominant throughout the life cycle of the Roden 
Street/GVA case.  In both cases, the adaptive practices outnumbered the 
administrative practices, while in the Ballymun case the enabling practices were even 
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more prevalent than the adaptive practices.  Again, the practice of actively supporting 
the inclusion of diverse skills / perspectives (including boundary-spanning), 
dominated in these cases, but the other two adaptive practices:  stimulating innovative 
ideas and changing plans, processes, routines in response to tensions, also featured 
more than in the medium and low complexity cases.   This is consistent with the view 
that leadership can create the context for innovative ideas and new ways of working to 
flourish and innovative responses to complex problems. 
 
The adaptive practices appear in each of the five decisions for Roden Street and in 
three out of the five decisions in the Ballymun case, while in the low complexity cases 
these practices appear infrequently.  Even more striking is the fact that in every key 
decision identified in the two most complex cases, there are one or more observations 
of enabling practices. In the next section we explain discuss these leadership practices 
in more detail, with a specific focus on the role of enabling leadership in managing 
the entanglement of adaptive and administrative practices. 
Enabling leadership within the cases 
As noted above, enabling leadership contributes to the ongoing balancing between 
adaptive and administrative practices by managing four core tensions, these are 
explained below.   
Buffering tension, acting to reduce conflict and injecting tension and conflict 
The first tension involves the interplay between buffering tension, acting to reduce 
conflict and injecting tension and conflict.  Skepticism, resistance and multiple 
divergent perspectives characterized all of the cases as some point in their 
development.  Interestingly, we observed twice the number of buffering/reducing 
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practices across our six cases than we did injecting of conflict and tension, with the 
Roden St./GVA project being particularly skewed toward this.  Indeed, one of the 
interviewees viewed the Roden St. project overall as an act of enabling leadership in 
relation to the wider redevelopment of the Greater Village Area - the ultimate aim of 
the regeneration initiative was "gaining a foothold in the area" (Interview notes).  
Individuals often played key roles in resolving differences and finding solutions to 
problems.  In Hardwicke Street, a low complexity case, early attempts were made to 
engage with the community early in the process to mitigate potential issue and deal 
with problems that threatened to derail the regeneration project. The estate manager 
acted like a buffer between the tenants and those involved in the regeneration process.  
He was referred to as a ‘troubleshooter’ managing concerns before they became a 
development block.   
 
There was significant concern too in Clonard regarding the inclusion of a new 
housing provider in the process. Worries over high rents, lack of consultation, lack of 
awareness of new personnel shifted the project into a period of uncertainty. This in 
turn instigated a period of confidence building on behalf of Oaklee with residents. 
This was managed through a conscious effort of reduce tension and local concerns. As 
the local Oaklee representative stated ‘I was there at Clonard every Friday for about 
two years. It allowed me to get to know the people to be rehoused’. A similar activity 
emerged in the medium complexity case of Fatima Mansions, with the joint working 
group continuing to meet through the lifetime of the project to deal with any 
unanticipated outcomes, and to receive and pass along feedback from residents.   
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The corresponding practice of injecting tension and conflict was also observed.  In 
Clonard, tension was raised after the visit of a Minister to the area during which he 
questioned the plans to knock down a historic building.  This resulted in a change to 
those plans (adaptive practice) and ultimately a re-phasing of the project to build 
sheltered housing first.  The NIHE then began to buffer conflict to keep the 
development inching forward – and this is particularly reflected in the initiation and 
resourcing of a community housing development role locally, and the engagement of 
a number of actors to secure this. In the case of Ballymun, we saw an injecting of 
tension through the Citizens’ Jury exercise, along with an effort at buffering saying 
that they felt it was worthwhile being optimistic about the future of Ballymun.  The 
Jury pointed out that change could not happen without a vision for the future – an 
implicit challenge.   
 
Giving meaning to events (sense-making / sense-giving) and disrupting existing 
patterns and assumptions  
 
The second of our tensions is the relationship between giving meaning to events 
(sense-making / sense-giving) and disrupting existing patterns and assumptions.  This 
tension contains more of a cognitive disruption or buffering achieved through either 
questioning people's assumptions or clarifying the meaning of aspects of the project.  
This pair of practices was by far the most prevalent set observed in our cases with 22 
observations, equally split between sense-making interventions and disrupting 
assumptions interventions.  However, it is again in the Roden St./GVA project in 
which the balance between practices on two aspects of the tension is skewed towards 
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the one that indicates a shift towards administrative leadership.  In the Ballymun 
project, the instances of these practices are evenly split as is the case in Clonard. 
 
In the medium and high complexity contexts the residents associations became 
symbols and catalysts for actions by directing attention to what was important for 
stakeholders.  The residents associations also engaged in efforts at sense-making 
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005) helping to crystallize for occupants the 
importance of the changes that were occurring, even if it was unclear exactly where 
the changes would lead.  As the changes emerged, the leaders began to see new 
possibilities for the regeneration projects.  Actors, such as the Chairman of the 
residents association in Clonard became a “tag” (Uhl-Bien and Marion, 2009) by 
being a focal point for the community, directing attention to critical issues, and being 
recognized as the spokesman for the area’s citizens. There were significant efforts at 
sense making around the changing identity of Clonard itself, (the name is a Gaelic 
word for a pasture or meadow).  The identification of a new second site close by 
(through a government decision setting aside traditional regeneration mechanisms and 
making the land available), allowed for a sensitive decanting of residents who were 
determined to stay in the same area. The District manager of NIHE reflected about 
this decision ‘The government release of the Mackies site was crucial’. A naming 
competition, run through the local newspaper, resulted agreement on Cluain Mor – the 
great pasture, connecting both the original and new communities.  
 
The enabling leadership practice of disrupting existing patterns and assumptions can 
be seen within high complexity Ballymun process. By ensuring that the Ballymun 
Citizen’s Jury looked afresh at key aspects of anti-community behavior, and sought 
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and received advice from the widest possible range of actors – including those 
internationally, a dialogue was enabled to ensure that all questions were answered, 
and that progress could be made. 
Similarly, in the high complexity case of Roden Street, the initiation of the project 
itself relied on a disruption of traditional arguments, following multiple 
(unsuccessful) efforts at giving meaning to events.  Recalling these early days, one 
interviewee commented, ‘We had numerous meetings that were a waste of time. It 
was clear that we needed an honest broker. In 1998 we brought in Mediation 
Network. The local MP came – the Rev Martin Smyth. Everyone was fighting amongst 
each other – he told them to get themselves together’. This did not in itself resolve 
issues, but it did ‘out’ real and deeply felt concerns reflected by another interviewee 
‘There was a real fear – that this was an underhand way of further denuding the 
protestant inner city population’ (NIHE interviewee). The disruption of existing 
patterns created a counterforce to inertia, but subsequent sense making around 
possible futures dampened down real fears. In Roden Street enabling activity involved 
leveraging social and political dynamics to stimulate or resist change.  Social and 
political pressures imposed by the context were converted to an advantage.  All of the 
NI cases were embedded in a ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) social and political 
environment shaped by the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ (Endnote 5).  This was also 
enabled as a change lever. For example, the initial engagement of Clonard Monastery 
as a host for early residents’ meetings in Clonard was symbolic as the Monastery was 
a community venue and was best known for having been previously used for the 
initial talks between John Hume and Gerry Adams that lead to the IRA ceasefire and 
eventually the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.  The actors who initiated the 
residents meetings were not the leaders of the various housing associations and they 
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acted from no official role or authority when they started. In Roden Street, the broader 
political environment was used as a generative push towards regeneration of a 
traditionally loyalist community in the ethno religious territoriality of Northern 
Ireland. 
Within the medium complexity case of Fatima Mansions we also see these types of 
enabling practices come to the fore at specific junctures in the developmental process. 
The first of these was the localization of Dublin local authority offices, which 
changed the access of residents to their estate managers.  The second was the 
introduction of a public –private partnership approach that acknowledged the need to 
move the project forward quickly. The Minister (Noel Ahern TD) commented at the 
time ‘I supported the City Council on choosing the PPP approach for Fatima 
Mansions as I believe that the PPP option has the potential to deliver the regeneration 
on a faster period than would be the case using the traditional procurement method’.  
 
In the low complexity cases, it is interesting to note that Hardwicke St. had the 
majority of its enabling practices occur in this set of practices, while Connswater had 
no examples of these practices. 
 
Coordinating and formalizing networks and facilitating and enabling informal 
networks  
Our third enabling leadership tension - Coordinating and formalizing networks vs 
Facilitating and enabling informal networks, was observed more often in the Northern 
Ireland (NI) cases than in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) cases with seven instances in 
NI compared to only two in ROI. For example, in Roden Street the creation of 
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‘community sustainability officer’ post early in the process invigorated the 
community stakeholders, coordinated efforts and allowed for the introduction of 
alternative plans for the area. It coordinated and formalized a valuable function, 
without which the project, already complex and controversial may have stalled badly.   
The Greater Village Regeneration Trust (GVRT) also helped to bring people to an 
agreement. Actors from across the stakeholder groups induced interactions, enhanced 
communication and acted as boundary spanners.  We also observed radical 
transformation, which emerged from the interactions of a few people within the 
regeneration projects. For example, in Clonard the NIHE supported the residents’ 
association, a self-organizing group, to operate without interference from formal 
authorities.  The emergence of the residents’ association facilitated interactions and 
initiatives and increased the amount of resources leveraged. For example, towards the 
end of the regeneration project the Clonard Residents Association had evolved from 
an ad hoc network (adaptive structure) to a professionalized association with staff and 
premises (administrative structure), which allowed them to leverage resources.  The 
central enabling process facilitated this transition. As one of the interviewee’s 
commented, ‘We had to build up relationships and be guided by the implementation 
plan. Formal networks were vital. A lot of initiatives just failed. Informal ones were 
also extremely important’. In the low complexity case of Connswater, we see that 
local residents association emerging for the first time, and facilitated by some small 
funding from the charity sector, begin to engage strategically the development of the 
community.  
In Northern Ireland, there was no cross-project pattern of balance between the two 
aspects of the tension, although unusually Roden St did exhibit balance between the 
two while the other NI projects were more skewed (Clonard towards Administrative 
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and Connswater towards Adaptive leadership).  In the Republic of Ireland, however, 
both observations in this practice tension emphasized formalising networks - one in 
Fatima Mansions and one in Ballymun.  In Fatima Mansions, the Fatima Regeneration 
Board was established early on in the project. It brought together an independent 
Chair (a former Chair of the Labour Court) and representatives from community 
groups, politicians and local authority to discuss the ongoing regeneration proposals 
and progress.  In Ballymun, the Board of the managing company (Ballymun 
Regeneration Ltd - BRL) was broadly based with representation from Dublin City 
Council, other statutory agencies, the commercial sector and representatives from the 
local community.  The main objectives of BRL were to plan and implement the 
regeneration project, to create sustainable development and build consensus among 
key stakeholders.      
 
Removing, excluding or alienating dissenting actors and protecting actors from 
external politics and top-down directives 
 
Our last leadership tension ‘Removing, excluding or alienating dissenting actors vs 
Protecting actors from external politics and top-down directives’ illustrates aptly the 
role of enabling leadership in protecting what are essentially creative processes from 
inhibiting forces such as policy makers, other administrators or environmental 
pressures (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002).  Such leadership was required 
to protect actors from external politics and top-down directives and preventing 
administrative leaders from stifling or suppressing beneficial innovation and 
adaptation (Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey, 2007).  Interestingly, the literature is 
less forthcoming on the opposite aspect of the tension, which involves removing or 
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excluding actors that do not agree and are a barrier to progressing the project.  This 
set of practices was the least observed across the six cases, but still was observed at 
least once in all but one of the cases. 
 
For example, in the medium complexity case of Clonard, the role played by the initial 
Chair of the resident’s association (who was himself a former builder) was seen as 
very significant in the early of the process. His tacit knowledge and community 
position enabled the residents to made real and significant interventions at an early 
stage. As one resident involved in this process commented ‘The chairperson… – he 
used to be a builder. That was very good, he knew what he was doing. They couldn’t 
just tell him anything’.  
 
We see a similar process in Fatima Mansions – our other medium complexity 
example. The early ‘Corcoran report’ (1998)  detailed a tenants survey,  which in turn 
documented and reinforced many of the issues that had been identified as social 
problems for many years and became incorporated into a national research report on 
social housing in Ireland.  The negative conclusions of the research gave empirical 
data and a strong argument for community groups to use in pressing for change (see 
Corcoran and Fahey 1999), and effectively acted as institutional acknowledgement of 
concerns as the project progressed.  
 
In one of our low complexity cases (Connswater), we see the initial exclusion of 
actors in an attempt to move the development more quickly than was reasonable. The 
lack of a functioning community group at this early stage meant that information 
about development plans was never fully communicated causing one resident to 
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protest ‘The first thing we knew about it was when leaflets were put through 
letterboxes. Even local politicians knew nothing about it’.  
 
Perhaps the most vivid examples of this leadership tension is within the high 
complexity cases, where significant external political forces were being exerted on the 
projects. In Roden Street, the significant resourcing of GVRT as a community 
resource, allowed it to operate as a strategic boundary spanner and not get dragged 
into local community difficulties, which would have further stalled the project. 
However, within all of the projects there was little acknowledgement of exclusion as a 
tactic (even though it undoubtedly occurred) and much awareness of inclusive 
practices. This may be reflective of the cases or more likely the reluctance of 
respondents to focus on the messy political micro processes which occur within 
complex organizational and community structures.  
 
Discussion: the duality of enabling leadership 
 
This article began by contesting the traditional, person-centric and hierarchical 
notions of leadership, underpinning much research in the public administration 
discipline and argued that the field might be enhanced by considering the social 
interactions and reciprocal influence patterns that enable leading–following 
relationships to develop and evolve over time (DeRue et al., 2011). Drawing on the 
emerging field of complexity leadership we argue that leadership emerges through 
dynamic interactions (Bradbury and Lichtenstein, 2000) when individuals as well as 
groups respond to both external pressures and conflicting constraints (Lichtenstein et 
al., 2006).   
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The six urban regeneration projects offered a unique and rich opportunity to examine 
complexity leadership in differentiated public sector settings. As such, the study 
contributes rare empirical examples to the field of complexity leadership, which, thus 
far, has been largely conceptual (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009).  We addressed 
our first research question by examining instances of adaptive, administrative and 
enabling practices in urban regeneration projects with varying degrees of complexity.  
Whilst our data suggests that the nature of leadership does vary by levels of 
environmental complexity (Figure 2), we are cautious about the claims that we can 
make from this aspect of our exploratory study. In particular, we recognize the 
limitations of evaluating complexity by only time and diversity and also translating 
qualitative data on reported instances of leadership practices into numerical counts.  
However, this exploratory work does reveal patterns.  The data suggest that 
administrative practices are more prevalent in the low complexity urban regeneration 
projects and adaptive practices are more prevalent as complexity increases.  Further 
empirical analysis, based on our coding framework and involving larger samples and 
quantitative methods, would be fruitful direction for future research.  
To address our second research question we examined the tensions inherent in 
enabling leadership.  Our initial conceptual model (Figure 1) positioned these tensions 
as dualisms e.g. Buffering tension, acting to reduce conflict v.s injecting tension and 
conflict. These tensions are often seen as dualisms because we “accentuate 
contradictions by interpreting data through simple, bipolar concepts, constructing 
logical, internally consistent sets of abstractions that separate opposites” (Lewis and 
Smith, 2012, p. 762). The literature frequently resorts to dualisms when considering 
leadership.  The literature is abundant with contingency theories portraying leaders as 
most effective when they adapt to some aspect of their environment (e.g., Fiedler, 
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1971). Our study suggests that it is may be erroneous to separate leadership practices 
into two opposed paired elements, (e.g. adaptive or. administrative).   
 
Our study shows that the challenges encountered in urban regeneration projects rarely 
occur in isolation so collectives often deal with multiple interconnected issues and 
challenges. Thus, in complex environments, these apparently competing practices 
may be occurring concurrently. Enabling leadership is required to both maintain a 
sense of stability in order to coordinate, structure and control organizational activity 
(administrative) as well as generate the conditions for innovation, change and 
transformation (adaptation) (Selznick, 1949; Uhl-Bien, Marion and  McKelvey, 
2007).  Therefore, these tensions may better be regarded as dualisms, rather than 
dualities (Farjoun 2010).  When constructed not as dualism but as duality the idea of 
two essential elements is retained but they are viewed as interdependent (Farjoun, 
2010).  Seen as dualities the twin functions of leadership are both contradictory and 
complementary. These elements are mutually enabling and a constituent of one 
another. Thus, administrative leadership creates the structures that both enable as well 
as constrain the adaptive actions of individuals and collectives (Giddens, 1984). 
Similarly, people's adaptive practices reinforce and reproduce a set of beliefs, norms 
and roles that create expectations that shape future performances of the action (Callon 
and Latour, 1981). 
 
Conclusions 
 In highlighting the tensions between administrative and adaptive practices and 
conceptualizing them as dualisms, rather than dualities (Farjoun 2010), this study has 
implications for leadership theory, development and practice.  Future research into 
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theoretical constructs could examine the complex, nonlinear dynamics of leadership. 
As with this study, qualitative approaches may be best placed to reveal and investigate 
interwoven tensions (Smith and Lewis, 2011) and depict the dynamic and mutually 
constitutive relationship between (Jarzabkowski, 2008) adaptive and administrative 
functions. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) may build upon our exploratory 
work by examining the conjuncture of variables and their inter-relationships and how 
these affect outcomes (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 1987). Comparing the findings of this study, 
especially in relation to enabling practices, to those proposed by Hazy and Uhl-Bien 
(2015) in relation to the ‘community-building, information gathering and information 
using’ leadership practices, will be an important next step in theory development. 
Building on the case research offered in this study, extending this analysis and 
comparing the findings to cases drawn from other settings and other sectors is an 
obvious next step. 
Day (2000; et al., 2014) argues that most leadership development is currently leader 
development, often driven by competency frameworks, focused on the styles, actions, 
and competencies of the individuals who have been formally assigned leadership roles 
or have potential to become leaders.  Bolden and Gosling (2006, p. 147) argue that 
competencies do not provide “a sufficiently rich vocabulary” for the complex, 
diverse, and connected nature of leadership (2006, p. 158). Seidle, B., Fernandez, S. 
and Perry, J. L. (2016) suggest well-designed leadership programs, incorporating a 
focus on the individual, their relationships and situational context and complexity, can 
assist in the development of positive leadership outcomes. Leadership development 
can also involve shaping the reasoning and affording opportunities to actors to 
generate activities aimed at resolving the prevailing challenges faced by the 
collective, while exploring synergistic opportunities for coping with enduring 
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tensions.  
In terms of leadership practice, our study suggests a core function of leadership is to 
embrace leadership tensions and help shift actors beyond “either/or” toward 
paradoxical thinking that entails a both/and mind-set that is holistic and dynamic 
(Lewis and Smith, 2012).  Acceptance of and engagement with leadership tensions 
can help actors to live and thrive with pressures (Smith and Lewis, 2011) and can 
motivate a search for new possibilities (Festinger, 1957).  Greater attention needs to 
be paid to the tensions inherent in leadership if actors are to cope with the complex, 
collaborative, cross-boundary, adaptive work in which they are increasingly engaged.  
 
Endnotes  
 
1. The supplement is drawn from previously published case descriptions that 
may also be found in Rhodes, M. L., J. Murphy, J. Muir and J. A. Murray 
(2010). Public Management and Complexity Theory: Richer Decision-Making 
in Public Services, Taylor & Francis. 
2. ‘Community composition’ is a variable that captures the differences between 
populations of a community. 
3. In the case of Roden Street/Greater Village, the project to regenerate Roden 
Street itself was relatively contained - consisting of 26 new dwellings and 
taking three years in planning and four years’ implementation.  For this reason 
it had originally been considered to be the least complex project in Northern 
Ireland, However, Roden St. was a only small subset of the larger project to 
regenerate the entire Greater Village Area (consisting of 1500 new dwellings) 
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which had begun in the 1990s and was still in the planning stages in the mid 
2000s. 
4. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2005), Northern Ireland 
Multiple Deprivation Measure, 
http://www.nisra.gov.uk/deprivation/archive/NIMDM2005FullReport.pdf 
5. ‘The troubles’ is a colloquial phrase used to denote the period of political 
violence in NI from the late 1960’s to the IRA and loyalist ceasefires of the 
early 1990’s.  
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Supplement – Extended Case Descriptions  
Roden Street/Greater Village Area: High Complexity 
Roden Street is small street in south Belfast that runs perpendicular to the Donegall 
Road – a large main street that has long been a point of reference in Belfast.  This 
project was a small ‘pilot’ nested within a much larger regeneration project, in the 
Greater Village Area of Belfast: a well-known Loyalist area with a long history of 
paramilitary activity throughout the Northern Ireland troubles (Shirlow, 2003).  
Overall, the population in the area had been dropping precipitously, many long-time 
residents moving out of the area and immigrants, students and new employees of the 
local hospitals moving in (Endnote 1).  Nevertheless, in terms of location, Roden 
Street and the Greater Village Area are considered to be prime real estate. 
Initially, the responsible public agency, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive 
(NIHE), had full capacity for undertaking the regeneration of the area.  In 1999, in 
order to gain some momentum for the redevelopment they proposed the demolition of 
111 dwellings (60% owner occupied, 20% private rental and 20% social), within the 
context of wider development plans for the greater village area, comprising 1,500 
dwellings.  A shift in funding led to the establishment of the South Belfast Partnership 
Board (SBPB), which in turn supported the creation of the Greater Village 
Regeneration Trust (GVRT).  The NIHE provided an administrative function, 
focusing on planning and coordinating operations.  The introduction of the South 
Belfast Partnership Board and the subsequent establishment of the GVRT changed the 
dynamics of interaction among stakeholders.  This was reinforced by the decision to 
create a ‘community sustainability officer’ post early in the process which itself 
fostered interconnectivity, created linkages, invigorated the community stakeholders 
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and allowed for the introduction of alternative plans for the area.  A GVRT proposed 
‘Framework plan’ for the area moved this process further forward, and engaged the 
community themselves, statutory and voluntary sector stakeholders and local political 
representatives.  This occurred alongside the formal vesting order for Roden Street 
itself – the beginning of the wider regeneration initiative. 
Two-thirds of the way through the regeneration project (in early 2003), the Fold 
Housing Association (Fold) was contracted to undertake all social housing 
development in the area.  Fold is a relatively large housing association operating 
throughout Ireland and had its own resources and influence to balance that of the 
NIHE.  In 2005, a ‘sod-turning’ ceremony on the Roden Street site was held and 
construction finally began on the 26 social housing dwellings to be built and managed 
by Fold.  
In the meantime, the NIHE published its draft proposal in 2004 for the redevelopment 
of the larger Greater Village Area (1,500 dwellings). The GVA proposal included five 
alternatives for consideration, ranging from a minor rehabilitation program to a ‘95 
per cent demolish/redevelop’ approach estimated to cost £107 million. However, the 
Greater Village Regeneration Trust reacted with disappointment to the long-awaited 
proposal, as it felt that it did not reflect the desires of the community documented in 
the framework proposal that had been launched in 2002. In response, the GVRT 
swung into action and produced a sixth alternative which the NIHE agreed to include, 
with its original five alternatives, in the consultation packs sent out to all residents in 
the area.  
The GVRT influenced the agenda going forward, with a proposal for low cost owner-
occupier housing in the wider Roden Street area – requiring NIHE to purchase land 
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from the Department of Social Development to facilitate low cost housing.  GVRT’s 
involvement continued placing them regularly at the center of a complex decision-
making along with the NIHE and Fold Housing Association. 
Ballymun: High Complexity 
Ballymun is the largest of the three projects in Dublin and, in fact the largest of all of 
the projects in the study.  A lot has been written about this area (Endnote 2) and the 
many features of the project cannot possibly be addressed in this brief summary.  The 
current regeneration project began in 1997 with the establishment of Ballymun 
Regeneration Ltd. (BRL), a semi-state company owned jointly by the Department of 
Finance and Dublin City Council.  The thirteen Board members of BRL include two 
local councilors, the City Architect, Director of Traffic and Managing Director of 
BRL (all three from Dublin City Council), three community representatives, four 
representatives from various statutory agencies (including the Secretary of the local 
University) and an independent chairman appointed by the Dublin City Council.  The 
project is funded through the Area Regeneration Program funding from the 
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, various urban 
renewal schemes and partnerships as well as targeted funding for particular programs 
such as childcare, health and social supports.  Overall the project covers an area of 
about 1.5 square miles and 5,200 dwellings (of which 2,800 are in flat complexes and 
2,400 are houses), with about 20,000 people living in the area.   
The 1998 Master Plan proposed an ambitious 10-year regeneration plan encompassing 
physical, social, economic, environmental, cultural and process elements.  Progress 
under each of these headings is tracked by the Monitoring Committee of the Board 
and reported every 1-2 years as a requirement of the Urban Renewal Scheme / 
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Integrated Area Program.  Because of the plethora of objectives, it is difficult to gauge 
the status of the project as a whole, but in terms of the housing elements, 
approximately 1200 of the 6000 planned new units were completed as of the end of 
2004, with another 1200 on site.  Demolition of the 15-storey tower blocks and 8-
storey ‘slab’ blocks had begun and both the civic center and leisure center on 
Ballymun’s new ‘Main Street’ were open for business.  Of the planned 6000 new 
units, the split between social and private is approximately 50/50, with the voluntary 
sector providing about 10% of the social housing.  The total number of dwellings that 
are planned for the area as a whole is nearly 10,000, with the social/private split being 
40%/60%.  This is a huge shift from the pre-project ratio of 80% social to 20% private 
housing and also incorporates a significant increase in housing density.   
The 2003-2004 progress report was upbeat about the increasing property values in the 
area and the attraction of private investment for the first time in decades.  
Unemployment was down and the number of childcare places was significantly 
increased with brand new neighborhood facilities supporting crèches, job centers and 
other community services.  With all the good news in the report however, a note of 
caution was sounded in the conclusion. “The success reported in this document is at a 
crucial phase and needs commitment and bolstering to maintain momentum and 
ensure that the huge public investment is supplemented and enhanced by private 
investment and secured to make a solid framework for the future.” (BRL 2005: 69)  
This suggests that management of the project is concerned that money (and 
government interest in the project) is running out.  It is difficult to get clarity on the 
budget figures for a project of this size and complexity, however the housing element 
of the plan was estimated to cost €332 million in the Master Plan.  The project end 
date at the time of completing the case study was 2010. 
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As we will see in each of the projects studied, there were a number of events and/or 
reports that led up to and shaped the official ‘beginning’ of the project.  Ballymun in 
its current form was created in the mid 1960’s as Ireland’s first (and last) high-rise 
social housing project.  Built on the outskirts of the city, near the airport, Ballymun 
was a symbol of progress in Irish urban planning and development and was designed 
address the serious shortage of urban housing at that time.  However, “it flew in the 
face of everything Irish politicians believed about housing” and was “an unrepeated 
experiment in modernity” (Power 1993) that was widely condemned as a failed estate 
fairly early on in its history.  Problems with construction, a lack of amenities in the 
area, poor housing management by the local council, economic recession, social 
change and drug-dealing, and misguided housing policy combined to plummet the 
community into a black-spot of unemployment, crime, anti-social behavior, vacant 
dwellings and boarded-up shops.  By 1986, turnover in the council housing had 
reached nearly 50% and this year was seen as a “year of crisis” in the area 
(Somerville-Woodward 2002).   
 
The difficulties in the area over the years had a lateral effect of generating significant 
expertise amongst residents in lobbing, complaining, working together and forging 
relationships with public and private sector organizations to address festering 
problems.  From broken lifts to bank closings, playgrounds to pools, the residents of 
Ballymun were nearly always organizing to protest about some crisis in their 
community.  In fact, Somerville-Woodward (2002) suggests that Ballymun became 
something of a training ground for local activists in the 1980s and the need to engage 
productively with residents led to Dublin Corporation (Endnote 3) moving the 
housing management and rent collection functions for the estate to a local office – the 
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first decentralization of this function in the state.  The first Housing Task Force for an 
urban estate was set up in Ballymun in 1987 and with a membership comprised of 
local T.D.s., members of the Ballymun Community Coalition, the Combat Poverty 
Agency, and officials from Dublin Corporation and the Eastern Health Board.  Not 
only was this an important step in including residents and other community 
representatives in a key local policy forum, but the agenda included social as well as 
physical improvements.   
 
One of the first projects undertaken by the Task Force was getting Ballymun to 
feature on Dublin Corporation’s list of estates scheduled for major Remedial Works.  
From not being on the list in November 1987, the Task Force succeeded in getting a 
major program proposed in June of 1988 costing between £50-70 million and planned 
for eleven phases over 10 years.  A novel element of the proposed program was the 
level of community involvement that was to be a feature of all physical/social 
improvements. 
 
After the first phase of the refurbishment was completed in 1993, the Department of 
the Environment and Local Government insisted that an evaluation be carried out to 
see if the project (which had cost double what it had been planned at) was achieving 
value for money.  The resulting report from Craig Gardner / Prices Waterhouse turned 
out to be a watershed in the history of the area as it included among its five 
alternatives the clearance and redevelopment of the entire estate.  However, the 
feeling of the community and Dublin Corporation was to go for a more conservative 
approach and, after a period of discussion, consultation and debate, to choose the 
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option of a balance of refurbishment and some demolition of the worst of the tower 
blocks, replacing these with housing more in keeping with Irish preferences. 
 
However, by 1996, the Celtic Tiger was beginning to roar and the Irish economy was 
picking up significantly.  The rainbow coalition was in power with an aggressive 
social agenda and the then Minister for the Environment, Brendan Howlin and 
Minister of State, Liz McManus suggested that, since the cost of refurbishment was 
extremely high and would need to be redone in another 15 years anyway, why not go 
for something that would once and for all rectify the mistakes of the past and put 
Ballymun on the path to a completely new future. The Ballymun Housing Task Force 
accepted this challenging opportunity with enthusiasm and a new entity was created in 
1997 to oversee the design and implementation of a whole new town – Ballymun 
Regeneration Ltd. (BRL).  Dublin Corporation would remain as the landlord of all 
social housing in the area as well as have the responsibility for those infrastructural 
elements that were under its remit (e.g., roads, lighting, sewage), but BRL would be 
responsible for the integrated planning and development of the area.  BRL was not as 
independent from Dublin Corporation or the state as was a predecessor entity, Temple 
Bar Properties Ltd., which was set up by legislation in 1991 to regenerate a run-down 
area on the south bank of the Liffey River.  While highly successful in terms of 
economic, cultural and architectural achievements, the Temple Bar project was seen 
by Dublin Corporation as having largely ignored social and community needs and, in 
particular, had made little contribution to the housing deficit in the city.  It was seen 
as crucial to ensure that this did not happen in Ballymun.  In order to clarify the roles 
of the various organizations involved, the Ballymun Housing Task Force was 
reconstituted to be a largely community-based group and was renamed the Ballymun 
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Neighborhood Council (BNC).  There are seven elected representatives from each of 
the five neighborhoods in Ballymun that sit on the BNC Board, as well as one 
representative each from Dublin City Council and BRL.  In addition all of the local 
T.D.s sit on the board of BNC.  BNC has the role of coordinating the community 
consultations with BRL as well as working with Dublin City Council and BRL to 
ensure that the changing needs of the community are understood and addressed.  In 
1998, the Ballymun Masterplan was published comprising 31 chapters covering every 
aspect of the plans for the area: from education to energy, transport to training and 
education, and economic development to community facilities.   
 
The non-profit housing sector also plays a role in this project, which is not the case in 
any of the other Republic of Ireland projects studied.  Non-profit housing providers 
were invited by BRL to tender to build housing and to gain sites with the result that 
approximately 140 d3wellings were complete by 2004, with another 160 dwellings 
planned.  These are a mix of rental accommodation and co-operative ownership and 
are spread throughout the Ballymun area.  In terms of decision-making on the overall 
project, however, the non-profit sector had virtually no role.         
Clonard/Cluain Mór: Medium Complexity 
The Clonard/Cluain Mór project began when the Clonard area of West Belfast was 
targeted for redevelopment by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) after 
the publication of the first Making Belfast Work (MBW) strategy in 1988. This area 
had long been an area of significant economic and social deprivation as well as civil 
unrest.  The targeted area consisted of 650 ‘kitchen’ or ‘parlor’ houses – terraced 
houses with two rooms on each of two floors.  The area was (and continues to be) 
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largely Catholic and Nationalist, with a tight-knit community and strong voluntary 
and community organizations and at the time prior to regeneration was nearly 100% 
owner occupied.  Upon hearing rumors of the possible redevelopment, area residents 
came together to form the Clonard Residents Association (CRA).  This was an 
informal emergent group, rather than an act of authority, comprised of interactive 
agents engaging in a cooperative effort.  The NIHE proposal to demolish 650 
dwellings and replace these with 200, necessitating the relocation of many residents, 
was met with dismay and it was clear to all involved that additional nearby housing 
would need to be found or built in order to gain community approval. 
Throughout 1992 and 1993 the CRA met frequently to discuss plans and to 
communicate issues, concerns and desires to the NIHE.  Negotiations between various 
government departments got underway to see if a solution could be found to the 
problem of additional housing, and the adjacent vacant site of the old Mackies metal 
works factory was identified as a potential housing site.  With the promise of 
approximately 300 new houses to be built on the Mackies site, the vesting order for 
the Clonard site as originally planned was approved in 1994. 
Phase I of the Clonard project got underway in 1995 and then, in 1996, the building 
program for all social housing was moved from the NIHE to Northern Ireland 
Federation of Housing Associations.  This resulted in the introduction of a new player 
- Oaklee Housing Association – one of the largest and most successful housing 
associations in Northern Ireland.  In spite of Oaklee’s reputation, there was 
considerable concern in the community about the moving of responsibility for the 
project from the NIHE to Oaklee, which could have derailed the constructive 
relationship among the stakeholders.  Many concerns where expressed from residents 
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when Oaklee came on board (concern over high rents, lack of consultation, lack of 
awareness of new personnel) and this instigated a period of confidence building on 
behalf of Oaklee with residents. 
The Cluain Mór development progressed rapidly after this with most of the original 
residents moving to this new development.  The good relationships between 
stakeholders, the use of the Mackies site and the placement strategy were regarded as 
successful.  Residents stayed involved over a long period of time and were able to 
‘professionalize’ the structure of the CRA with staff and premises providing the NIHE 
and Oaklee a direct consultation mechanism but allowed them to leverage support 
materially and psychologically from the wider west Belfast community. 
Fatima Mansions: Medium Complexity 
The Fatima Mansions project is located in the southwest section of Dublin City, 
relatively near to the city center, consisting mainly of local authority constructed and 
managed flats.  While the location is prime in terms of access to city-based amenities, 
jobs and transport systems, the area has a reputation for crime, drug-dealing and other 
anti-social behavior that is one of the worst in the country.  Originally consisting of 
363 flats and 11 acres, Fatima Mansions represents a medium-sized project in Dublin 
and, at the end of 2004, the project to regenerate the area was just getting underway, 
with about 1/3rd of the original fourteen apartment blocks demolished, residents 
moved out and the redevelopment plan approved and project managers in place. 
While the project was originally conceived as a local authority one, in 2003 a decision 
was made to reconfigure the project as a public-private partnership (PPP) and to seek 
bidders to carry out the plans that had been agreed after protracted negotiations 
among residents, the local authority and elected officials.   
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In 2004 Moritz-Elliot, a joint venture between Moritz holdings and P. Elliot 
Construction (Ltd), was selected to complete the project, with the local authority 
playing more of a facilitating, rather than an active implementation role going 
forward. In the course of this shift to private sector implementation responsibility, 
some of the original plans were changed, notably the mix of public and private 
housing shifted significantly from a 50%/50% split between social and 
private/affordable in 2001 to a 25%/75% split in 2004.  Furthermore, the planned 
density of the area was increased from 500 to 600 dwellings.  The overall effect of the 
current plan will be to decrease by 60% the number of social housing dwellings in the 
area (from 363 to 150) and to add a large number of private and affordable dwellings 
(380 private and 70 affordable).  It is important to note, however, that in 2000, when 
the first plans for regeneration were being developed, just 255 of the 363 social 
housing flats were occupied.  By August 2004, only 150 units remained occupied as 
residents had already begun to move to other local authority dwellings to facilitate the 
first phases of demolition.   Furthermore, the community-based Fatima Regeneration 
Board (FRB) was consulted as part of the changeover process and agreed to the 
changes after several community amenities were added.      
 
In order to understand the context for the regeneration project in Fatima Mansions it is 
helpful to sketch out some of the history of the area and the changes that impacted on 
it.  Following the initial construction of 14 four-story flat complexes in 1951, the 
development “housed a successful working-class community for a [two] decades, 
forming a small part of the complex social fabric of the inner city with close ties to 
the industrial economic functions of the immediate area” (Punch et al 2004:12).  
 57 
However, the early 1970s brought a severe recession, with many of the traditional 
industries closing up or moving out of the city, leaving a concentration of low-skilled 
unemployed in the area.  The protracted recession and high-levels of unemployment, 
along with an unravelling of the social fabric due to drugs, emigration, and misguided 
government policies such as the ‘surrender grants’ of the 1980s left the area a virtual 
wasteland of boarded-up flats, drug-dealing and criminal gangs.  The physical 
refurbishment of the flats by Dublin City Council in the late 1980s “did nothing to 
halt the decay of the estate or improve other aspects of the quality of life (Fahey 1999: 
5).  
In 1995, the local authority established the Fatima Task Force, made up of a number 
of community groups and statutory agencies, with the aim of tackling the socio-
economic issues in the community.  Around the same time another community-based 
‘uber-group’ was formed – Fatima Groups United – which had similar aims to the 
Fatima Task Force, but was made up of a wider set of community and voluntary 
groups and did not include the statutory representatives.  Over time, Fatima Groups 
United (FGU) emerged as the representative ‘voice’ of the community and, in 2000, 
this group prepared a key document outlining the aims of the community for 
regeneration and a vision of how residents and other stakeholders could be included in 
the decision-making processes going forward.  The document was titled “Eleven 
Acres, Ten Steps” and contained a list of ten strategic goals for the area.  The goals 
had little to do with physical regeneration, but all had social and/or process elements 
that FGU felt were crucial to achieving a turn-around in the area.  Many of these 
principals and aims were incorporated into the first ‘Master Plan’ for the project 
developed by the local authority in 2001, entitled “Regeneration / New Generation”, 
which marked the official beginning of the project.   
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During 2000, however, other changes were occurring that were to have significant 
impact on the current structure and aims of the project.  The Government passed the 
Planning and Development Act (2000) which made numerous changes to the 
legislation governing development, including a new provision allowing local 
authorities to reserve up to 20% of all new developments for social and affordable 
housing.  Though this was modified to the advantage of the private sector in a 2002 
amendment, the change put developers on notice that the government was serious 
about increasing the output of social housing and that the private sector was going to 
have to contribute.  Furthermore, the Act underpinned the shift towards mixed 
developments of social and private housing as a strategic direction in housing 
provision.   
 
In addition, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were included as an important element 
of the National Development Plan 2000-2006 (NDP) that would speed up the 
provision of badly needed infrastructure and decrease demands on the Exchequer.  
The Department of Finance encouraged the various departments to ramp up their use 
of PPPs, with the effect that the Department of the Environment and Local 
Government created a special unit to identify likely projects that would benefit from 
this kind of structure.  Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that Dublin City 
Council decided to change to a PPP structure for the Fatima Mansions project in 
2003, in spite of local opposition at the time. 
 
Finally, the Eleven Acres, Ten Steps document recommended that a Fatima 
Regeneration Board replace the Fatima Task Force as the main (community-based) 
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governance body for the project.  On this board were to be an equal number of 
community representatives (four) from each of the Fatima Mansions estate and the 
surrounding Rialto area.  This was seen as a crucial step in achieving better lines of 
communication and trust among residents of the two areas as well as facilitating 
integrated decision-making.  In addition, an equal number of representatives from the 
political sphere and relevant local authority (2 each) were on the Board, with a 
chairman from outside this group to be selected by the group itself.  This Board was 
established as part of the master plan and was still functioning at the end of the case 
study (2005).  The main players in the project were:  1) Dublin City Council with 
responsibility for monitoring the fulfilment of the terms of the PPP contract and 
facilitating the regeneration process as required, 2) Moritz/Elliot with responsibility 
for delivering on the agreed plan and 3) the Fatima Regeneration Board with 
responsibility for representing the aims of the community during the implementation 
phase and facilitating ongoing communication among the various stakeholders in the 
area.             
Hardwicke Street: Low Complexity 
The Hardwicke Street project is the smallest and least complex of the three cases.  
The project encompassed the regeneration of 11 blocks and 210 flats in Dublin's 
'northside' and was managed directly by the local authority throughout its duration.  
There were a minimal number and range of stakeholders involved, namely the local 
authority, the residents and the construction company who won the tender. The total 
time required from the start of the project (1999) to its conclusion (2005) was 
relatively short. 
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In the 1980's the Hardwicke Street area became a relatively dangerous part of the city, 
with high levels of drug-use, stealing and dumping of cars and other anti-social and 
criminal activity.  By the late 1990s it became clear that the entire area needed to be 
redeveloped as a matter of urgency.  The first decision to include Hardwicke Street in 
a program of redevelopment was made by Dublin Corporation in 1997 following the 
allocation of government funds for regeneration and the introduction of a new 
government policy of localization; "Better Local Government".  However, it was not 
until 1999 that the project really got underway and initial consultations were made 
with the community.  A year later Dublin Corporation went through a significant 
reorganization, and Hardwicke Street became part of the "North East Inner City" area 
and services with the community came under the remit of the local (DCC) office for 
that area. 
The reorganization of Dublin Corporation created some uncertainty and the 
appointment of a local housing manager, to work out of the local office established in 
2000 produced boundary-spanning opportunities between the local authority and the 
local community.  Recognizing that many of the residents lived in a "climate of fear" 
and that some groups that had claimed to represent the community did not have the 
support of ordinary citizens, DCC and a number of legitimate community 
stakeholders commissioned an independent research body to assess the needs of the 
area and to ensure that the regeneration plan took a holistic approach to the social, 
economic and structural issues that existed.  Once the survey was completed in 2002, 
the project went to tender and Dublin City Council reviewed seven tenders for the job, 
as specified by the Council’s Deputy City Architect.  Following the selection of 
Foreman Construction (Ireland) Ltd to undertake the regeneration, the project 
leadership processes reverted to more or less standard administrative processes.  With 
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minimal changes, apart from going over budget by roughly 40% - not unusual in the 
Celtic Tiger economy of the time, the project was completed in three years. 
Connswater: Low Complexity 
The Connswater area is located within the ‘Island’ local Government electoral ward 
of East Belfast (identified by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) as 
Belfast 2). The Island ward is made up of a large industrial site that was previously 
part of the Harland and Woolf shipyard, which - after years of neglect - was targeted 
for regeneration and is now known as ‘Titanic quarter’. The remaining part of the 
ward (about 25%) is the Connswater area.  
This area had consistently been identified as having some of the worst levels of 
poverty and deprivation in Northern Ireland emerging as the 34th worst out of 582 
wards in Northern Ireland in terms of the Noble indicators8 in the period studied.  The 
area is strongly unionist and virtually all the residents are Protestant. While there were 
low vacancy rates, the population was aging and the school roll was dropping. At the 
time of the study, the total population was 1800 people. 
In 1998, based upon the findings in the Northern Ireland House Condition Survey of 
1996, the NIHE determined that approximately 500 terraced houses in the Connswater 
area should be targeted for regeneration. However, in order to avoid speculative 
buying in advance of regeneration, the decision was not made public until the 
redevelopment plan was well advanced and vesting was applied for in 1999. The first 
time that local residents or politicians were notified of the redevelopment plans was 
the distribution of leaflets informing the community of the application for the vesting 
order. 
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In response, residents and politicians formed the Mersey Street Area Residents 
Association (MARA) in September 1999 to discuss local concerns about 
redevelopment and to generate ideas as to how the community could make its 
concerns known to the authorities. MARA received funding assistance and support 
from both the East Belfast Partnership Board (via the East Belfast Community 
Development Association and the International Fund for Ireland9. By April 2001, 
MARA succeeded in putting together a document detailing the concerns of local 
residents and business, including a ‘ten--point plan’ for future engagement with the 
NIHE. The document addressed a range of issues including specific physical 
requirements for housing and area layout, a request for affordable housing, and 
consultation and development process recommendations. In addition to the points in 
the ten—point plan, residents raised serious concerns about the decision to close the 
Mersey Street Primary School in the face of declining enrolment. 
Phase I of the project had been completed in late 2001, consisting of demolition of 
existing dwellings and the construction of 33 new social housing units by Connswater 
Housing Association.  Phase II got going in 2002 and incorporated nine of the ten 
points raised by MARA and included the construction of 55 new dwellings.  This 
second phase was scheduled for completion in early 2006 (after the completion of the 
case study). 
Endnotes for Supplement 
 
1. The area containing Roden Street is the local government Blackstaff Ward 
which has lost over 20 per cent of its population in ten years between the 
censuses of 1991 and 2001, and was rated one of the worst in the country in 
terms of the Noble index of multiple deprivation. 
 63 
2. See Power (2000), Norris (2001) and Somerville-Woodward (2002) 
3. Now called Dublin City Council 
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Appendix 1 
Leadership practice Source Exemplary data 
Adaptive   
A) Stimulating innovative 
ideas and new ways of 
working; [8] 
 
Roden Street (Interview– 
NIHE Representative) 
‘A couple of people 
working in parallel with 
the South Belfast 
Partnership Board came 
to a decision to bring 
people to a consensus – 
that was the birth of GVRT 
in 1999/2000’. 
B) actively supporting the 
inclusion of diverse skills / 
perspectives (including 
boundary-spanning); [23] 
 
Fatima - (Interview: Local 
Authority Representative) 
 
“The process of agreement 
was part of a continued 
engagement with the 
interests of the residents” 
 
C) changing plans, 
processes, routines in 
response to tensions [14] 
Ballymun - (Interview – 
Ballymun Regeneration 
Ltd Representative) 
Altering the initial process 
- "to knit Ballymun back 
into the fabric of the city" 
Enabling (Dualities)   
D.1) acting to reduce 
conflict; 'buffering' tension 
[8] 
 
Hardwicke Street –
(Interview – Area Housing 
manager) 
 
“the estate manager acts 
like a buffer between the 
tenants and those involved 
in the regeneration 
process…” 
 
VS   
D.2 injecting tension / 
conflict;[5] 
Connswater – (Interview 
with resident) 
 
“there is a suggestion that 
tenants felt under pressure 
from NIHE to accept 
alternative housing with 
few choices available and 
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with the alternative of not 
being housed at all if they 
didn’t agree” 
 
   
E.1) giving meaning to 
events (sense-making and 
sense-giving)[11] 
 
Clonard - (Interviewee – 
NIHE Representative) 
 
A recognition on behalf of 
the NIHE that it was a 
community with a unique 
history and this had to be a 
factor in regeneration 
process - “The area has a 
strong community 
infrastructure. It’s very 
proud and very political”. 
VS   
E.2 disrupting existing 
patterns and 
assumptions;[11] 
 
Ballymun - (Interview – 
Community organizer). 
 
For the first time, the 'do 
nothing' response was 
understood to be untenable 
- "The publication of the 
Craig Gardiner Report in 
August 1993 marked a 
watershed in the history of 
Ballymun” laying out a 
range of options for a new 
future for the area. 
 
   
F.1) coordinating and 
formalising networks [6] 
 
Clonard - (Interview– 
NIHE Representative) 
 
“The housing officer was 
very important in creating 
the communication with 
residents” 
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VS   
F.2 facilitating and 
enabling informal 
networks;[3] 
 
Roden Street – (Interview 
with NIHE representative) 
 
“The organizations are 
interacting after our 
initiations” 
 
   
G.1) removing, excluding 
or alienating dissenting 
actors [2] 
 
Connswater - (Interview - 
Housing Association 
member) 
“The first thing we knew 
about it was when leaflets 
were put through 
letterboxes. Even local 
politicians knew nothing 
about it” 
 
VS   
G.2 protecting people / 
ideas from external politics 
and top-down directives 
[4] 
 
Clonard - (Interview - 
Residents Group Member) 
 
“The chairperson …. he 
used to be a builder. That 
was very good, he knew 
what he was doing. They 
couldn’t just tell him 
anything. His daughter is 
still involved”. 
 
Administrative   
H) directing, planning and 
resourcing activities; [16] 
 
Ballymun -The Ballymun 
Masterplan 
 
The Ballymun Masterplan 
with 31 chapters covering 
every aspect of the plans 
for the area: from 
education to energy, 
transport to training and 
education, and economic 
development to 
community facilities. 
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I) creating clear lines of 
authority, roles and 
responsibilities; [13] 
 
Hardwicke Street – Project 
documentation 
 
‘The North West Inner 
City Area Housing Office 
was opened in July 2000, 
providing a range of 
services dealing with 
needs as diverse as 
housing allocations and 
transfers, maintenance, 
welfare and environmental 
issues.  This office deals 
with all City Council 
services in the area, 
particularly housing and 
community services’ 
 
J) integrating and 
embedding innovation into 
the formal system [14] 
 
Fatima (Interview - Local 
Authority Representative) 
 
“We tried to build on as 
much of their plan (Eleven 
aches, ten steps) as 
possible, we went out of 
our way to build a 
relationship…” 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Adaptive, administrative and enabling leadership practices   
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Table 1 : Classifying urban regeneration complexity by diversity and duration 
Urban Regeneration 
Case and level of 
Complexity 
Diversity Duration 
HIGH COMPLEXITY   
Roden Street/Greater 
Village (Northern 
Ireland) 
 
 
Large  / Small 
• Multiple different communities 
and community groups 
• Multiple political actors 
• Two proposed phases (111 
dwellings demolished followed 
by 1500 demolished) 
• Funding shift from NIHE to 
Housing Association provider 
• History of division, 
paramilitarism and sectarian 
conflict 
Short / Long 
(Endnote 3) 
• Long 
gestation 
period, 7 
years to get 
outcome in 
phase 1, 
phase 2 
ongoing 
Ballymun  
(Republic of Ireland) 
 
Large 
• History of severe deprivation 
and poor housing as Ireland’s 
first (and last) high rise social 
housing project.  
• Covers 1.5sq miles with 5,200 
dwellings (2,800 flat 
complexes and 2,400 are 
houses) 
• Social housing / private 
housing slit of 40%/60% 
• Multiple complex objectives, 
including housing, childcare, 
job centers, community 
services. 
• Multiple local voluntary actors, 
with significant organizational 
capacity, including seven 
elected reps from five housing 
neighborhoods.   
Long 
• Initiated in 
1997 
• 10 year plan 
MEDIUM 
COMPLEXITY 
  
Clonard (Northern 
Ireland) 
Medium 
• Four phases involving 
Medium 
• 7 years from 
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replacement of 650 dwellings 
with 200 
• Long political history of 
community cohesion within the 
context of the NI conflict and 
sectarian violence 
• A significant number of agents 
involved, including community 
group, political reps, NIHE and 
housing association 
• Funding shift from NIHE to 
housing association 
initial 
negotiations 
to completion 
of both 
phases 
 
Fatima Mansions 
(Republic of Ireland) 
 
Medium 
• Close to Dublin city center but 
with reputation and history as 
high crime, drug dealing and 
antisocial behavior.  
• Originally comprised of 363 
flats and 11 acres 
• Well organized and collective 
local voluntary and community 
sector working together 
(Fatima Groups United).  
• Significant legislative change 
with provisions for social 
housing 
 
Medium 
• Six year 
duration, 
initiating in 
2000 
 
LOW COMPLEXITY   
Hardwicke Street 
(Republic of Ireland) 
 
Small 
• Regeneration and replacement 
of 210 apartments 
• Minimal range of stakeholders 
involved 
• High levels of conflict and 
deprivation 
 
Short 
• 5 years from 
initial 
negotiations 
to completion 
Connswater  
Northern Ireland 
Small 
• Located within large industrial 
site previous part of Harland 
and Woolf shipyard 
• Identified as having some of 
the worst levels of poverty and 
deprivation in NI (Endnote 4) 
• Phase 1 & 2 saw the vesting of 
Short 
• Five year 
duration 
(2000 to 
2005).  
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the original 489 properties and 
the construction of 88 in their 
place.  
• Strongly unionist and 
protestant community with 
significant issues around 
sectarianism / racism.  
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Figure 2: Number of instances of adaptive, administrative and enabling practices by 
case 
 
 
Leadership 
Practices 
Adaptive:  Enabling (Dualities): Administrative:   
A) stimulating 
innovative 
ideas and new 
ways of 
working; [8] 
 
D.2) injecting 
tension / 
conflict [5] 
VS D.1) acting 
to reduce 
conflict; 
'buffering' 
tension[8]  
H) directing, 
planning and 
resourcing 
activities; [16] 
 
 B) actively 
supporting the 
inclusion of 
diverse skills / 
perspectives 
(including 
boundary-
spanning); 
[23] 
 
E.2) disrupting 
existing 
patterns and 
assumptions 
[11]   
 
VS E.1) giving 
meaning to 
events (sense-
making and 
sense-
giving)[11] 
I) creating clear 
lines of authority, 
roles and 
responsibilities; 
[13] 
 
 C) changing 
plans, 
processes, 
routines in 
response to 
tensions [14] 
F.2) 
facilitating and 
enabling 
informal 
networks [3] 
 
VS F.1) 
coordinating 
and 
formalizing 
networks [6] 
J) integrating 
and embedding 
innovation into 
the formal system 
[14] 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
Regeneration 
Cases 
 VS  G.2) 
protecting 
people / ideas 
from external 
politics and 
top-down 
directives [4]   
 
VSG.1) 
removing, 
excluding or 
alienating 
dissenting 
actors [2] 
 
HIGH: Roden 
St. / GVA (NI) 
A: 4  D.1: 3 H: 2 
B: 7 E.2: 1 E.1: 3 I: 2 
C: 4 F.2: 2 F.1: 2 J: 1 
 G.2: 1   
HIGH:  
Ballymun 
(ROI) 
A: 1 D.2: 1 D.1: 1 H: 2 
B: 3 E.2: 3 E.1: 3 I: 1 
C: 3  F.1: 1 J: 2 
 G.2: 1   
MED: Clonard 
(NI) 
A: 1 D.2: 1 D.1: 2 H: 4 
B: 6 E.2: 3 E.1: 3 J: 5 
C: 5  F.1: 2  
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 G.2: 1 G.1: 1  
MED: Fatima 
(ROI) 
A: 2 D.2: 1 D.1: 1 H: 3 
B: 4 E.2: 2 E.1: 1 I: 1 
C: 1  F.1: 1 J: 3 
  G.2: 1   
LOW: 
Connswater 
(NI) 
B: 1 D.2: 1  H: 2 
C: 1 F.2: 1  I: 1 
  G.1: 1 J: 2 
LOW:  
Hardwicke St. 
(ROI) 
B: 2  D.1: 1 H:3 
  E.2: 2 E.1: 1 I:3 
    J:1 
 
 
